\u3cem\u3ePerdomo v. Holder\u3c/em\u3e: A Step Forward in Recognizing Gender as a  Particular Social Group  Per Se by Le, Minh T.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 52
Issue 6 Volume 52 E. Supp.: Annual Survey of Federal
En Banc and Other Significant Cases
Article 10
4-1-2011
Perdomo v. Holder: A Step Forward in Recognizing
Gender as a "Particular Social Group" Per Se
Minh T. Le
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Minh T. Le, Perdomo v. Holder: A Step Forward in Recognizing Gender as a "Particular Social Group" Per Se, 52 B.C.L. Rev. E. Supp. 109
(2011), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol52/iss6/10
PERDOMO V. HOLDER: A STEP FORWARD IN 
RECOGNIZING GENDER AS A 
“PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” PER SE 
Abstract: On July 12, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Perdomo 
v. Holder, ruled that the Board of Immigration Appeals had erred in find-
ing that an asylum applicant failed to establish membership in a “particu-
lar social group” under the Immigration and Nationality Act when she de-
fined the social group as “all Guatemalan women.” This Comment argues 
that the BIA should use Perdomo as an opportunity to establish gender as a 
“particular social group” per se in order to address the inconsistency with 
which courts have defined this category in asylum cases involving gender-
based persecution. 
Introduction 
 Individuals seeking asylum in the United States who have suffered 
gender-based persecution have faced substantial difficulties in navigat-
ing an asylum system that does not explicitly recognize gender-related 
persecution as grounds for political asylum.1 Immigration laws afford 
the Attorney General the discretion to grant political asylum.2 In order 
to qualify for this protection, however, an applicant must be a refugee 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).3 To qualify as a 
refugee, an asylum seeker must show that (1) she has suffered persecu-
tion or has a well-founded fear of persecution, (2) on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or politi-
cal opinion, and (3) is unable or unwilling to escape this persecution.4 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A Unifying 
Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 777, 781–83 (2002); Bret Thiele, 
Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee Law Reform, 11 Hastings Women’s L.J. 
221, 221–22 (2000). 
2 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The relevant language in the INA defines a refugee as 
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the 
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such 
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, 
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group 
or political opinion . . . . 
109 
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 Gender is not a recognized ground under which applicants may 
receive protection within this definition.5 Asylum seekers who have suf-
fered gender-based persecution must fit their applications within one 
of the statutorily recognized categories.6 Such asylum seekers generally 
use the “membership in a particular social group” category.7 Unfortu-
nately, the legislature has declined to define the scope of this term, and 
courts have been reluctant to include gender under this category for 
fear of inundating immigration courts with asylum claims.8 In response, 
asylum seekers who have suffered gender-based persecution have be-
gun to base their applications on membership in very narrow social 
groups in order to increase their chances of a favorable outcome.9 This 
method has allowed courts to extend protection to those individuals 
who have presented valid claims for political asylum without the fear of 
opening the floodgates to immigration.10 
 The narrow approach of defining a “particular social group” is 
problematic, however, for victims who suffer persecution solely on the 
basis of their gender.11 This Comment addresses one such case, Perdomo 
v. Holder, a 2010 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court involving a petitioner’s attempt to define “all women in Gua-
temala” as a “particular social group.”12 Part I provides a brief back-
ground of the case, including the facts of the petitioner’s asylum appli-
                                                                                                                      
Id. 
5 See id. 
6 See id.; Jenny-Brooke Condon, Asylum Law’s Gender Paradox, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 
207, 249 (2002) (discussing the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees’ defi-
nition of refugee, adopted by the United States in the INA, and its failure to include a 
gender category, which has forced applicants who have suffered gender-based persecution 
to base their claims on one of the other recognized categories); Allison W. Reimann, Hope 
for the Future? The Asylum Claims of Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1199, 1232 (2008). 
7 Condon, supra note 6, at 211; see Reimann, supra note 6, at 1232; Thiele, supra note 1, 
at 224–27. 
8 See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005); Reimann, supra note 6, at 
1258. 
9 See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1237 (3d Cir. 1993) (defining “particular social 
group” as “the social group of the upper class of Iranian women who supported the Shah 
of Iran, a group of educated Westernized free-thinking individuals”); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & 
N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (defining “particular social group” as “young women of the 
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had [female genital mutilation], as practiced by 
that tribe, and who oppose the practice”). 
10 See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 358. 
11 See Tanya Domenica Bosi, Yadegar-Sargis v. INS: Unveiling the Discriminatory World of 
U.S. Asylum Laws: The Necessity to Recognize a Gender Category, 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 777, 
791–92 (2003); Thiele, supra note 1, at 224–26. 
12 See 611 F.3d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 2010). 
2011 Perdomo and Gender as a “Particular Social Group” Per Se 111 
cation that make her claim particularly relevant to the issue of gender-
related persecution.13 Part II discusses the Ninth Circuit’s argument for 
the expansive definition of “particular social group,” which illuminates 
the inconsistency with which courts have applied this term.14 Finally, 
Part III argues that, in light of these inconsistencies, the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA or “Board”) should use Perdomo as an opportunity 
to expressly qualify gender as a “particular social group” per se.15 Such 
an expansion will likely raise concerns of inundating immigration courts 
with asylum claims, but the framework of political asylum law itself pro-
vides a practical limit to the extension of asylum.16 
I. Gender in Perdomo v. Holder 
 In Perdomo, the Ninth Circuit rejected a narrow interpretation of 
“particular social group” and called for an expansive definition that 
would accommodate a group defined exclusively by gender.17 Perdomo 
presented the case of Lesley Perdomo, a Guatemalan woman who faced 
deportation after living continuously in the United States since 1991.18 
In response to a removal order, Perdomo requested asylum based on 
her fear of persecution as a member of the “particular social group” of 
“all women in Guatemala.”19 She based her persecution claim on the 
high incidence of murder of women in Guatemala.20 Perdomo pre-
sented various reports describing these “femicides,” including docu-
mentation of their brutality, their prevalence, and the Guatemalan gov-
ernment’s lack of responsiveness.21 The immigration judge denied her 
                                                                                                                      
13 See infra notes 17–25 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 26–60 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 61–85 and accompanying text. 
16 See Condon, supra note 6, at 229–30; Reimann, supra note 6, at 1258–59; infra notes 
61–85 and accompanying text. 
17 See 611 F.3d 662, 663, 666–69 (9th Cir. 2010). 
18 Id. at 664. Perdomo entered the United States without inspection in 1991, at age fif-
teen. Id. She attended high school in Reno, Nevada, and until she received her removal 
notice, she worked as a Medicaid account executive at a medical facility in Reno. Id. In 
April 2003, she received a Notice to Appear, which charged her as removable for unlaw-
fully entering the United States. Id. 
19 Id. Perdomo first defined the social group as “women between the ages of fourteen 
and forty who are Guatemalan and live in the United States,” but later revised this group 
to include “all women in Guatemala.” Id. at 665. She gave no reason for the revision, but 
the characterization of the first social group suggests she had first attempted to identify 
herself with a very narrow class of women, a common method for asylum seekers whose 
claims are based on gender-related persecution. See id.; Bosi, supra note 11, at 791–92. 
20 Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 664. 
21 Id. These murders have been termed “femicides” because they are gender-based and 
are often associated with brutality and sexual violence. See Reimann, supra note 6, at 1209. 
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application, and the BIA affirmed on the grounds that she had failed to 
prove that she was a member of a “particular social group” under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.22 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the BIA’s reasoning and re-
manded the case for a determination of whether the group “all women 
in Guatemala” constitutes a “particular social group.”23 In remanding 
the case, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that it did not have the power 
to make this decision itself and that this determination must be left to 
the BIA in the first instance.24 The court nonetheless advocated for an 
expansive definition of “particular social group,” which would include 
groups characterized by gender alone.25 
II. Proposed Expansion in Defining a “Particular Social Group” 
 The Ninth Circuit advocated for an expansive definition of “par-
ticular social group” in three ways.26 First, by concluding that the BIA’s 
decision in Perdomo was in opposition to the Board’s own precedent in 
the 1985 decision in Matter of Acosta, the Ninth Circuit implied that the 
BIA’s definition of “particular social group” in Acosta should be read 
expansively.27 Second, the court pointed to its own decisions as present-
ing a trend towards explicitly recognizing groups unified solely by gen-
der as “particular social groups.”28 Third, the court expressly rejected 
the notion that a group may not constitute a “particular social group” 
merely because all of its group members may qualify for asylum.29 Us-
ing its 1996 decision, Singh v. INS, the Ninth Circuit addressed the fear 
of inundating immigration courts with asylum claims and implied that 
                                                                                                                      
22 Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 665. 
23 Id. at 669. 
24 Id. (citing Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 185–87 (2005)). 
25 Id. at 665–69. Although Perdomo defined her “particular social group” as “all Gua-
temalan women,” the characteristic that defines her social group is her gender and not her 
nationality. See id. at 665-67. Perdomo’s proposed fear of persecution rested on her status 
as a woman based on the prevalence of violence in Guatemala against women in general, 
rather than violence against Guatemalan women in particular. See id. Her suggested “par-
ticular social group,” therefore, is characterized on the basis of her gender rather than her 
nationality. See id. In support of such a characterization, the Ninth Circuit stated that al-
though it has not expressly held that “females, without other defining characteristics” com-
prise a “particular social group,” it has acknowledged that such a group, regardless of oth-
er specific characteristics, could constitute a “particular social group.” Id. at 667 (citing 
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
26 Id. 
27 See id. (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985)). 
28 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 666–67. 
29 Id. at 669. 
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this should not be an issue of central concern in deciding whether a 
group qualifies as a “particular social group.”30 
A. An Expansive Reading of Matter of Acosta 
 In Acosta, the BIA used the doctrine of ejusdem generis31 to define 
“particular social group” as one whose members share a common, im-
mutable characteristic.32 The Board reasoned that the specific grounds 
of persecution listed in the INA—race, religion, nationality, and politi-
cal opinion—are forms of persecution targeted at immutable charac-
teristics, characteristics that an individual cannot change or that are so 
fundamental to individual identity that such a change should not be 
required.33 Requiring individuals in a particular social group to possess 
this type of characteristic ensures that asylum is extended only to indi-
viduals who are either unable to, or should not be required to, avoid 
persecution.34 Such a characteristic could be innate, such as gender or 
family ties, or acquired through shared experiences.35 The Board quali-
fied this definition, however, with the caveat that the kinds of shared 
characteristics qualifying individuals as members of a particular social 
group would have to be examined on a case-by-case basis.36 
 Courts have interpreted the holding in Acosta in two ways.37 Some 
courts have interpreted the Board’s “case-by-case” language as requir-
ing that individuals share an additional characteristic besides gender to 
qualify as members of a particular social group.38 Other courts have 
adopted an expansive reading of Acosta and concluded that gender 
                                                                                                                      
30 See id. 
31 See Black’s Law Dictionary 594 (9th ed. 2009) (explaining that, under the doc-
trine of ejusdem generis, when general words follow a list of specific words, the general words 
should be construed to be consistent with the specific words). 
32 See 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233, overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
33 See id. (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006)). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. (listing former military leadership and land ownership as examples of shared 
past experiences that could qualify for membership in a particular social group). 
36 Id. 
37 See Crystal Doyle, Isn’t Persecution Enough? Redefining the Refugee Definition to Provide 
Greater Asylum Protection to Victims of Gender-Based Persecution, 15 Wash. & Lee J. Civil. Rts. 
& Soc. Just. 519, 537–38 (2008); Thiele, supra note 1, at 228. 
38 See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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alone can identify members of a particular social group because gender 
is a shared characteristic that group members cannot change.39 
 In Perdomo, the BIA had denied Lesley Perdomo’s application for 
asylum solely on the grounds that “all women in Guatemala” was not 
recognized as a “particular social group” under the INA.40 In remand-
ing the case and concluding that the BIA had ruled against its own 
precedent in Acosta, the Ninth Circuit implied that Acosta should be 
read expansively, to allow “particular social group” to be defined exclu-
sively by gender.41 
B. Support in the Ninth Circuit’s Precedent 
 The Ninth Circuit next pointed to its own case law to support an 
expansive interpretation of “particular social group.”42 In its 1986 deci-
sion in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, the Ninth Circuit, motivated by a fear of 
allowing too many people to qualify for asylum, defined the particular 
social group category based only on a voluntary association that united 
the group members.43 Recognizing that it was the only circuit to adopt 
such a narrow definition, the Ninth Circuit amended this test in a 2000 
case, Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, to include the BIA’s reasoning from 
Acosta.44 In Hernandez-Montiel, the Ninth Circuit adopted a two-pronged 
test that recognized groups whose members are united by either a volun-
tary association or an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the 
identities of the group members that they cannot or should not be re-
quired to change it.45 This test reflected the combination of the Ninth 
Circuit’s own reasoning in Sanchez-Trujillo with the BIA’s reasoning in 
Acosta.46 In adopting the two-pronged approach outlined in Hernandez-
Montiel, the Ninth Circuit effectively abandoned the narrow interpreta-
                                                                                                                      
39 See, e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing 
“Somalian females” as a particular social group); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 
1993) (recognizing Iranian women as a particular social group). 
40 611 F.3d at 667. In its analysis, the Board never reached the other requirements of a 
claim for political asylum under the INA. Id. These requirements include: (1) whether the 
harm stated amounted to persecution, and (2) whether the persecution was on account of 
Perdomo’s membership in the stated “particular social group” or whether she was unable 
or unwilling to avoid such persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006); Perdomo, 611 
F.3d at 664, 667. 
41 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 669. 
42 See id. at 666 (citing Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 
2000); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
43 801 F.2d at 1576. 
44 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1092–93; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
45 225 F.3d at 1093. 
46 Id. at 1093 n.6; see Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
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tion set out in Sanchez-Trujillo in favor of a more expansive definition of 
particular social group.47 
 In denying Lesley Perdomo’s application for asylum, the BIA relied 
on dicta in Sanchez-Trujillo, in which the Ninth Circuit cautioned against 
using broad-based characteristics that identify large segments of the 
population to define a “particular social group.”48 The Ninth Circuit, in 
its remand, reasoned that an analysis of whether a group qualifies as a 
particular social group does not end with Sanchez-Trujillo and urged the 
BIA to use the more expansive test set out in Hernandez-Montiel.49 The 
Ninth Circuit seemed to suggest that the “innate characteristic” prong of 
the Hernandez-Montiel test may be even more applicable than the “volun-
tary association” prong set out in Sanchez-Trujillo.50 The court cited sev-
eral cases in which groups have qualified as “particular social groups” 
based on a shared innate characteristic regardless of the groups’ size.51 
By identifying Hernandez-Montiel as the relevant authority for the BIA on 
remand, the Ninth Circuit called for a more inclusive test that would 
expand the definition of “particular social group” to include groups that 
are defined by innate characteristics such as gender.52 
C. Singh v. INS: A Response to the Floodgates 
 The Ninth Circuit also highlighted its 1996 decision, Singh v. INS, 
to address the policy concerns raised by recognizing a “particular social 
group” defined only by gender.53 In Singh, the BIA denied asylum to an 
applicant who based his application on past persecution of Indian citi-
zens of Fiji.54 This social group, recognized as Indo-Fijians, made up 
around half the population of Fiji.55 The BIA denied the petitioner’s 
application based on its finding that the harm to the petitioner did not 
amount to persecution because these harms were experienced by all 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1092–93; Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. 
48 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668 (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577). 
49 Id.; see Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1092–93. 
50 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1092–93; Sanchez-Trujillo, 
801 F.2d at 1576. 
51 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668 (citing Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (recognizing “all alien homosexuals” as a “particular social group”); Mihalev v. 
Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing “Gypsies” as a “particular social 
group”)). 
52 See id.; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1092–93. 
53 Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 669 (citing Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
54 Singh, 94 F.3d at 1356. 
55 Id. 
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Indian citizens in Fiji.56 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the 
BIA had, in effect, denied asylum on the basis that the petitioner’s 
identified social group encompassed too large a part of the Fijian popu-
lation.57 The court reasoned that a group could not be denied classifi-
cation as a “particular social group” solely because all of its members 
would qualify for asylum.58 That decision implied that the size and 
breadth of a group should not be a basis for refusing to recognize a 
group as a “particular social group.”59 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Per-
domo implicitly rejected the argument that groups identified by gender 
alone should not be recognized as “particular social groups” because 
they are too large and their recognition would result in an overabun-
dance of asylum claims.60 
III. Closing the Floodgates 
 The Ninth Circuit’s discussion proposing an expansive definition 
of “particular social group” illuminates the persistent inconsistency with 
which courts have applied this term in cases involving gender-based 
persecution.61 The BIA should use Perdomo as an opportunity to bring 
clarity and consistency to the asylum process for those who have suf-
fered gender-related persecution by allowing “particular social group” 
to be defined by gender per se.62 
 The difficulties in applying the term “particular social group” are 
due in large part to the lack of binding authority defining it.63 Without 
clear legislation classifying gender as a “particular social group” per se, 
courts have been reluctant to make this type of ruling for fear of setting 
dangerous precedent and overwhelming the immigration courts with 
asylum claims.64 This is a widely recognized problem, and various agen-
cies have issued guidelines to assist immigration courts in adjudicating 
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. at 1358. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 1359. 
59 See id. 
60 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 669. 
61 See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665–69 (9th Cir. 2010); Andrea Binder, Gender 
and the “Membership in a Particular Social Group” Category of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 
Colum. J. Gender & L. 167, 179–80 (2000); Doyle, supra note 37, at 541. 
62 See generally Perdomo, 611 F.3d 662. 
63 See Doyle, supra note 37, at 540–41; Reimann, supra note 6, at 1233 (quoting Lwin v. 
INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
64 See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005); Binder, supra note 
61, at 179–81; Doyle, supra note 37, at 539–40. 
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asylum cases involving gender-based persecution.65 These include the 
1995 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of International 
Affairs (“INS Guidelines”) and the proposed regulations on the issue 
released in 2000.66 These documents, however, only provide guidance 
and are not binding authority to the courts; immigration courts still do 
not have a definitive answer as to whether a “particular social group” 
may be defined by gender alone.67 
 The BIA has the opportunity to provide such an answer in light of 
Perdomo.68 The Supreme Court has clarified that the BIA has adjudica-
tory power to determine whether a proposed group qualifies as a “par-
ticular social group.”69 A ruling by the BIA that the group defined as 
“all women in Guatemala” constitutes a “particular social group” would 
provide clear and definite precedent for all courts deciding asylum 
claims.70 Such a holding would resolve the discrepancies that have 
plagued the courts in deciding claims involving gender-based persecu-
tion.71 Furthermore, the BIA would find support for such a ruling not 
only in the INS Guidelines, the proposed regulations, and its own case 
law, but also in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Perdomo.72 
 Of course, such a ruling raises the concern of overwhelming im-
migration courts with asylum claims.73 Scholars have noted, however, 
that the statutory framework of asylum law itself provides an effective 
limit to the extension of asylum protection.74 An individual does not 
receive a grant of asylum merely by showing that she belongs to a cate-
gory that is a recognized ground for persecution.75 An asylum seeker 
                                                                                                                      
65 See Condon, supra note 6, at 215–18; Doyle, supra note 37, at 539–41; see e.g. Asylum 
and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000); Memorandum 
from Phyllis Coven, Office of Int’l Affairs of the U.S. Dept. of Justice, to All INS Asylum 
Office/rs and HQASM Coordinators (May 26, 1995), available at http://cgrs.uchastings. 
edu/documents/legal/guidelines_us.pdf [hereinafter INS Guidelines]. 
66 See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76593; INS Guidelines, supra 
note 65, at 13–14. 
67 See Condon, supra note 6, at 215–18; Doyle, supra note 37, at 539. 
68 See generally Perdomo, 611 F.3d 662. 
69 See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 185–87 (2005). 
70 See Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that an agency’s interpreta-
tion of statutory terms is entitled to deference by the courts)). 
71 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 665–69; Doyle, supra note 37, at 541. 
72 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 666–69; Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 
76593 (Dec. 7, 2000); INS Guidelines, supra note 65, at 13–14. 
73 See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005); Reimann, supra note 6, 
at 1258. 
74 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2006); Condon, supra note 6, at 229–30. 
75 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A); Condon, supra note 6, at 229–30. 
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who bases her claim on gender-related persecution has the burden of 
proving (1) she has suffered or has a “well-founded” fear of suffering 
harm that rises to the level of “persecution,” (2) on account of her 
membership in a protected group, and (3) that she is unable or unwill-
ing to escape this persecution.76 This burden provides an effective limit 
not only to grants of asylum, but also to the number of claims filed.77 
 Furthermore, asylum law aims to protect those who are unable to 
protect themselves from persecution.78 An analysis of asylum claims 
should therefore focus primarily on the potential of persecution rather 
than the number of potential applicants.79 The INA was enacted to es-
tablish a comprehensive refugee policy that would comply with the 
1967 United Relations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.80 
This Protocol reflects a refugee definition drafted during the 1951 Ref-
ugee Convention to address the effects of World War II and the refugee 
crises that took place in Europe during the war.81 Thus, political asylum 
aims to protect those who suffer persecution and cannot or should not 
be required to change when their governments have failed to provide 
adequate protection.82 Based on this rationale for asylum law, a situa-
tion could arise in which a majority of a country’s population is sub-
jected to persecution, from which it has no protection, based on some 
immutable characteristic.83 It would be irrational to conclude that asy-
lum laws should not extend protection to a group of individuals merely 
because they would comprise too large a segment of their country’s 
population.84 Likewise, it would be irrational to deny asylum to female 
members of a nation’s population merely because a gender-based social 
group represents too large a segment of the population.85 
Conclusion 
 Although the BIA has established that a “particular social group” 
includes groups whose members share a common, immutable charac-
teristic, courts have been reluctant to recognize gender as a “particular 
                                                                                                                      
76 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1011 (a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1); Bosi, supra note 11, at 804. 
77 See Condon, supra note 6, at 229–30; Reimann, supra note 6, at 1259. 
78 See Niang, 422 F.3d at 1199–1200; Bosi, supra note 11, at 810–12. 
79 See Niang, 422 F.3d at 1199–1200; Bosi, supra note 11, at 810–12. 
80 Doyle, supra note 37, at 535; Thiele, supra note 1, at 222. 
81 Binder, supra note 61, at 169; Thiele, supra note 1, at 223. 
82 See Thiele, supra note 1, at 223; Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 
1985), overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
83 See Reimann, supra note 6, at 1260. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
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social group” per se. This hesitancy has lead to inconsistent interpreta-
tion of that phrase in asylum cases involving gender-based persecution. 
In remanding Perdomo to the BIA, the Ninth Circuit used its opinion to 
advocate for the express recognition of “particular social groups” de-
fined exclusively by gender. The Board should use Perdomo as an oppor-
tunity to address the inconsistencies in interpreting this category by 
establishing gender as a “particular social group” per se. 
Minh T. Le 
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